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Welfare Usage in the U.S.: 
Does Immigrant Birthplace and Immigration Status Matter?
* 
 
The study of welfare participation in the U.S. prior to the 1996 welfare reform act and even 
afterward has focused on comparisons between native born and immigrant households. 
Analyses that have gone beyond this broad classification have focused on comparisons 
across race or with particular focus on particular groups like Hispanic immigrants. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no study yet that tests for difference in welfare usage among 
immigrant groups and immigrant status. We do not expect welfare usage to differ among 
immigrant groups if we control for the factors that should predict welfare usage. Similarly, if 
immigration status does not prevent welfare usage for certain immigrants, then ceteris 
paribus, we do not expect welfare usage to differ among immigrant based on status. We 
investigate these possibilities by testing three related hypothesis using probability models. 
Our results suggest that birth place matters and the probability of welfare usage is not the 
same for all groups. We also find that for some birthplace groups, citizen and non-citizens 
differ with respect to welfare usage. Finally, we find that post welfare reform, the probability of 
being on welfare in comparison to U.S. born increased for all immigrant groups and these 
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The issue of welfare usage among immigrants has gradually gained momentum in the last two
decades in the political debates in the United States after the abuses noticed in various welfare
programs- supposedly by immigrants. Although the hospitality and generosity of the United States
are laudable, welfare programs are extremely costly for the American taxpayers who have asked for
the overhaul of the welfare system after the revelations of many abuses within the programs. Some
economists went as far as saying that some of the states have become welfare magnets for welfare
seeking immigrants (Borjas, 1999). Such revelation and other evidence of welfare abuse led to the
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PROWORA) in
1996, which restricts the eligibility of legal immigrants who arrived after August 1996 to the federally-
funded welfare programs for 5 years. According to Kaushal (2005), the legislation was strictly
motivated by two factors: ﬁrst, that the generosity of the United States is attracting low-skilled
immigrants who later become a burden to the federal government. Second, immigrant dependence
on means-tested programs has drastically increased, thereby raising some budgetary concerns.
Coincidentally, the post-reform period is marked with the steady increase in the inﬂow of im-
migrants into the United States from various regions. Moreover, there were various developments
around the world that contributed to this surge. For instance, the 1990s saw an increase in the inﬂow
of immigrants from war-torn African and Eastern European countries. However, after the passage
of the welfare reform, the number of refugees gradually declined, according to the department of
Homeland security, the 85,706 refugees in 1999 to 48218 in 2007. On the other hands, while the
United States has tried to restrict the eligibility of immigrants into various federally-funded welfare
programs, the number of newly naturalized immigrants has increased. According the department
of Homeland Security, the number of naturalized immigrants increased from 837,418 in 1999 to
1,046,539 in 2008.
Although the existing literature has laid down the groundwork for future research, it has however
failed to address two critical questions: First, does the birthplace of the immigrant matter with
respect to their welfare participation? This problem is of great importance because when analyzing
the impact of immigrants on the labor markets and welfare, previous research have lumped together
the immigrants group. This paper helps solve this issue by disaggregating the dataset and examining
2the impact of immigrants birth place on the welfare participation. Second, does the immigrant status
really matter with respect to their welfare usage? In other words, we want to examine whether
naturalized immigrants have diﬀerent welfare participation relative to noncitizen immigrants.
First, we show from a very simple model that if economic and demographic factors are the sole
drivers of welfare usage, then in a probability model controlling for these variables, if we divide the
sample based on place of birth, the probability of welfare usage should not diﬀer across groups.
This leads to the ﬁrst hypothesis we test that birth place should not matter for welfare usage. The
second hypothesis come from our expectation that the increase in restriction on welfare usage for
immigrants post 1996 should lead to a decrease in the probability of welfare usage for immigrants
in comparison to U.S. born. Hence we test the hypothesis that the probability of welfare usage
post democracy decreased for all immigrant groups and decreased equally among these groups. The
last hypothesis is based on an expectation of higher welfare usage for naturalized citizens versus
noncitizen immigrant because of the restriction on the latter group post welfare reform. Hence we
test the hypothesis that naturalized citizen because they lack legal restriction and hence reveal their
true preference for welfare usage, have a higher probability of using welfare than noncitizens.
We test these hypothesis using simple probit models and two diﬀerent measures of welfare usage:
restricted and unrestricted. Controlling for economic and demographic factors that should predict
welfare usage, we estimate the probability of welfare usage for the diﬀerent groups in comparison to
U.S. born. Our results leads to the rejection of all our hypotheses. First, although some immigrant
groups share similar probability of welfare usage, birthplace seems to matter for welfare usage.
Second we ﬁnd that in comparison to U.S. born that the probability of using welfare increased
for immigrants post welfare reform and the level of increase diﬀered across groups. We show that
this result is not driven solely by changes in immigrant population type over the last 10 years
and immigrants arriving pre reform also experienced an increase in probability of welfare usage in
comparison to their U.S. born counterpart. In addition, we also ﬁnd that in contrast to what we
expect, naturalized immigrants on average use welfare less or equal to noncitizen immigrants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we review the literature and highlight
the welfare reform of 1996. In section three we highlight the data we will be using and present some
descriptive statistics. In Section four we discuss our theoretical and economic foundations and outline
3our proposition/ hypothesis and empirical strategy. In section 5 we present our results and provide
possible explanations for the results. In the last section we provide inferences and conclusions
2 Literature Review
The issue of immigration gained momentum in the 1990s after the passage of the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PROWORA) in 1996. Prior to the welfare
reform, the literature found evidence of welfare abuse by immigrants. Borjas, (1994) noted that
some “generous” states had become magnets for welfare-seeking immigrants. He also noted that
immigrants with high level of productivity tend to adapt more rapidly to the host nation labor
market conditions. However, the ones lacking the skills required by the host’s nation employers tend
to rely heavily on welfare programs to supplement their incomes. Borjas ﬁndings and the results
of other immigration specialists, in addition to a public perception of U.S. born Americans that
individuals were abusing the welfare system by not applying for jobs, having more children and
remaining unmarried to qualify for more welfare beneﬁts, are some of the reason that led to the
passage of PROWORA.
Several studies have compared immigrant and natives welfare usage. Borjas and Trejo, (1991)
found evidence that immigrant use the welfare system more intensively than natives. Borjas (1996)
also ﬁnds the probability of receiving cash beneﬁts diﬀer for immigrant and natives though the
diﬀerence is small. This result slightly contrasts with the ﬁnding of Blau (1984) who found that
immigrants and native households have the same probability of participation into the welfare system.
The diﬀerent results might be linked to the time periods considered as there is evidence that recent
immigrants tend to use welfare programs more. Also, the contrasting result again may highlight
the need for speciﬁc decomposition of the immigrant native gap in welfare use by types of welfare
programs. This issue was highlighted in Borjas (1996). He emphasized that although the immigrant-
native diﬀerence in the probability of receiving cash beneﬁts is really small, if other non cash
programs are considered which a huge share of welfare programs is, the gap widens.
There are also several papers that show economic agents whether native or immigrants respond
to diﬀerences in welfare beneﬁts across location and time. This response to diﬀerences in welfare
beneﬁts across states has led to the classiﬁcation of some states as “magnet states” for immigrants.
4Zavodny (1997) tests this magnet welfare state hypothesis noting that welfare payments are not
correlated with immigration levels; rather, the presence of earlier immigrants is the primary deter-
minant of the locational choices of new immigrants. However, the authors looked at all immigrants
together and it is possible that the eﬀect might diﬀer within the immigrant population given the
institutional and social factors that led to immigration. Her results are in contrast to Borjas (1999)
who provides evidence in support of the welfare magnet thesis. He ﬁnds that immigrant welfare
recipients are more heavily clustered in high-beneﬁt states than the immigrants who do not receive
welfare, or than natives. The interesting question that ties into what we will be analyzing in this
paper is if the immigrants who are welfare recipient are randomly distributed among all ethnic
backgrounds or if there are place of origin eﬀects. Huﬀman and Kilkenny (2003) result also supports
this view of labor responding to welfare programs. They investigate whether the welfare decline
and labor force participation increase in the U.S. can be attributed to state welfare parameters
and other opportunities. They compare welfare and labor force participation Midwestern families
who are eligible for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to the rest of the U.S. and
ﬁnd evidence of diﬀerences in trends which could imply that individuals labor force participation is
responsive to welfare programs both for citizens and immigrants. As mentioned above, the United
States congress in response to the ﬁnding and allegations of welfare abuse of immigrants decided
to grab the bull by the horns by passing the welfare reform of 1996, which restricts the eligibility
of noncitizens immigrants. In response to the welfare reform, some states decided to supplement
the federally funded welfare programs by providing state-funded public assistance programs to legal
immigrants who have been aﬀected by the new law. This some have concluded would have led to
a more pronounced magnet state eﬀect and might explain the diﬀerences in the Borjas (1999) in
contrast to Zavodny (1997). The impact of the welfare reform on the welfare participation of legal
immigrants has been investigated by several authors. Borjas (2000) noted that since welfare reform
the use of welfare dropped among both natives and immigrants but with steeper decline among im-
migrants although immigrants still have higher participation rates. The gap in participation rates
in food stamp programs he found to be attributed to diﬀerences in socioeconomic characteristics
between the two groups, particularly educational attainment. He also found a strong link between
use of cash beneﬁt in the immigrant generation and the use of food stamps in the second generation.
5Borjas (2002) investigates the impact of the welfare reform on the healthcare coverage of immigrants.
He ﬁnds that despite the restrictions provided by the reform, the immigrant population did not see
the substantial reduction in its health care coverage. He attributed this ﬁnding to the increase in
the labor supply by the immigrants after the passage of the reform, thereby raising the probability
of being covered by employer-sponsored health insurance. Furthermore, Borjas (2002) examines the
impact of the welfare reform on the welfare use in immigrant household. He ﬁnds that the welfare
participation rate of immigrants decline relative to the natives at the national level. He attributed
this drop to the decline in the welfare participation of immigrants in the state of California, which
host one of the largest immigrant groups. Other research projects on the impact of the welfare
reform on immigration have focused primarily on the impact of the legislation on the labor market
outcomes of the latter (Lofstrom and Bean, 2002).
Although the existing literature has investigated the impact of welfare on immigrants before
and after the reform, it has however failed to examine whether there is an ethnic diﬀerence in the
welfare participation of immigrants. However, some recent papers on immigration in developed
nations signal the need for a more decomposed analysis of immigrants. Lofstrom and Hansen(2003)
provide evidence that the higher welfare utilization of immigrants in comparison to natives is not
solely an American phenomena, using a large panel data of Sweden. More importantly, they ﬁnd that
diﬀerences among immigrants exist. They ﬁnd that refugee immigrant display substantially higher
public assistance participation rates upon arrival in Sweden compared to non-refugee immigrants,
but they assimilate out-of welfare at a faster rate than non-refugee immigrants. Ekhaugen (2005) also
ﬁnds diﬀerences among immigrants to Norway with respect to welfare usage overtime. She ﬁnds that
non-western immigrants to Norway rely heavily on welfare transfers and this continues for several
years after immigration. Interesting and unexpectedly, she ﬁnds some evidence of assimilating out
of welfare for refugee while other non-western immigrants assimilate rapidly into welfare. The
need for more speciﬁc decomposition of welfare program usage among immigrants and native born
can also be inferred from some of the results of Borjas (1996). He highlighted ethnic networks as
a potential channel for transmission of the knowledge of the available welfare programs between
newly arrived and earlier immigrants. Hence, if economic and education status of early migrants
diﬀers among immigrant groups, then even if new migrants from the same immigrant group are
6poor and more likely to use welfare they will have less information than another poor immigrant
groups whose early migrants used the welfare programs intensively. These diﬀerences in information
can lead to diﬀerences in welfare usage among diﬀerent immigrant groups. For example if early
African migrants to the US were highly educated and less likely to use welfare then there might
be a lower probability that the new African immigrants might use the welfare programs even if
they came in as refugees or via the visa lottery . The exact opposite might also be true if early
immigrant from another country or ethnicity tend to be poor and uneducated and needed to use
the welfare programs much more. Finally, there is not as much in the U.S. on exit from welfare
usage or assimilation out of welfare programs. Lofstrom and Hansen(2006) is one paper that focuses
on this question in the case of Sweden. They try to explain the role of entry and exit rates on
immigrant-native diﬀerences in welfare participation. However Ekhaugen (2005) and Lofstrom and
Hansen(2003) results might suggest that there are group diﬀerences among immigrants with respect
to exit out of welfare programs. Both papers ﬁnd that refugees exit faster from welfare programs
than other immigrant group. Our paper attempts to ﬁll the void in analysis of the U.S. experience
by examining if there are ethnic diﬀerences in welfare participation and if response rates diﬀered
across diﬀerent groups post the 1996 welfare reform. In addition, we examine the role of immigration
status on welfare usage.
2.1 Overview of the 1996 Welfare Reform
In light of the abuses noticed in the diﬀerent welfare programs, congress passed the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in August 1996. The PRWORA
excludes legal noncitizens that arrived after August 1996 from various federally-funded welfare pro-
grams. Thus immigrants who arrived after the aforementioned period were not eligible for means-
tested programs such as foodstamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), for at least 5 years.
Strong opposition from immigrant advocates led the federal government to restore food stamps and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the children, disabled and elderly (Kaushal, 2005). It is
important to mention that in response to the restrictions of the eligibility of immigrants to the
welfare programs, the federal government gave the diﬀerent states the options of extending bene-
ﬁts to legal noncitizens that have been aﬀected by the new law and some states did. Some states
have used state-funds to either supplement or restore safety-net programs for their most vulnerable
7immigrants. Thus states such as California, New York and Texas that host large immigrant popu-
lations have extended eligibility to newly-arrived immigrant groups. According to Kaushal (2005),
“10 states have created food stamps programs, 15 have substitute Medicaid, 3 have substitute SSI,
and 19 have provided funds for the welfare needs of newly arrived immigrants. Of the six traditional
immigrant states where three-fourths of all immigrants live, only California provides newly arrived
immigrant families access to all four programs. In Illinois and New York, newly arrived immigrants
get Medicaid but no other beneﬁts. In Texas, Florida, and New Jersey, newly arrived immigrants
get none of these beneﬁts.” Moreover, immigrants themselves have also increased their labor force
to mitigate the eﬀect of the reform on the healthcare (Borjas, 2003).
Prior to the 1996 reform, with the exception of refugees, all immigrants were entitled to AFDC
and SSI three years after their arrival (Hao and Kawano,2001). However, due to the numerous
abused of the various programs noticed, congress passed the law despite the outcry from the various
immigrants advocates. The welfare reform placed explicit restrictions on the eligibility of nonciti-
zens to receive the temporary Assistance for Needy families (TANF)1, food stamps, Medicaid, SSI
and other health and social service programs (Lofstrom and Bean, 2002). This law particularly
targeted legal immigrants who entered the country after August 22, 1996. The need to restrict the
access of legal immigrants to the welfare system stems from the debates that immigrants were using
extensively welfare programs and that the United States was attracting low-skilled immigrants who
later on become a liability to the host country. Another reason for the passage of the law is the
general perception that some immigrants make their immigration to the United States on the basis
of the generosity of the welfare programs, which is known in the literature as the “welfare magnet”
hypothesis. According to Kaushal (2005), this legislation was strictly motivated by two factors: ﬁrst,
there was a general perception that immigrants were abusing the welfare system. Second, there was
fear that the US welfare system was attracting low-skilled immigrants who are likely to become a
liability to the system.
3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly
survey sponsored by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) that provides
8information about individual persons and households. In this study we speciﬁcally make use of the
data from the 1994-2008 CPS March supplements. The questions center on demographic character-
istics, income and other economic variables as well as labor market activities. It also includes other
annual supplementary information like health insurance. We derive multi-stage stratiﬁed samples
of the CPS from IPUMS. We select the period of 1994-2008 for our analysis because the question
on immigrants birth place continent was only introduced in 1994 and fully deﬁned from 1995. The
break down of birth place continent was limited in the 1994, for example, we cannot diﬀerentiate
immigrants from Africa from immigrants from most parts of Asia. Given our main focus is in dif-
ferences in birth place continent in welfare usage, this means we only have one years before the
welfare reform in our dataset and 12 years post the reform. Also controlling for health is important
in predicting welfare usage and this variable is only available from 1996 in the CPS. Hence we will
focus on the 1996-2008 data for most of our estimations to adequately control for this factor. For
the hypothesis for which we are interested in comparing pre and post reform welfare usage, we will
eliminate this control and compare pre and post reform estimates without controlling for health
status.
One of the advantages of using the CPS via IPUMS is that it makes cross-time comparisons using
the March CPS data more feasible as variables in IPUMS-CPS are coded identically or “harmonized”
for 1962 to 2008. The CPS data can be used to create a two-year panel by matching the Outgoing
Rotation Group (ORGs) between consecutive survey years. The ORG component is made possible
because the CPS uses a 4-8-4 sampling scheme. This means that each household is in the survey
for four consecutive months, out for the next eight, and then returns for the following four months.
We however do not make use of this property because of problems faced with trying to match
observations over the two consecutive years in IPUMS.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
As stated above, the objective of this study is to examine whether the birthplace and educational
background of immigrants matter with respect to the welfare usage. Table 1 provides the summary
statistics of various welfare forms across natives and immigrant groups. Speciﬁcally, we present
the welfare usage of food-stamp, heat subsidy, public housing, welfare income and any form of
welfare. With respect to food-stamp, our table shows that other North American immigrants have
9Table 1: Welfare Usage by Birth Place
Africa C.A.C Asia Europe South Oceania Natives Other North
America Born America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Food Mean 1.072 1.1 1.048 1.045 1.046 1.055 1.084 1.091 1.27
stamp Stand. Dev. 0.25 0.3 0.21 0.2 1.011 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.44
N 7868 146666 68586 42441 20624 1599 2245738 9424 3827
Heat Mean 1.017 1.018 1.012 1.018 0.53 1.009 1.03 1.029 1.09
Subsidy Stand. Dev. 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.54 0.096 0.17 0.16 0.29
N 7868 146666 68586 42441 20624 1599 2245738 9424 3827
Public Mean 0.56 0.59 0.42 0.32 0.53 0.5 0.29 0.53 0.81
Housing Stand. Dev. 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.5 0.54 0.57 0.51 0.57 0.72
N 7868 146666 68586 42441 20624 1599 2245738 9424 3827
Welfare Mean 0.016 0.021 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.023 0.047
Income Stand. Dev. 0.12 0.14 0.1 0.09 0.094 0.091 0.11 0.15 0.21
N 7137 134609 63590 38856 19046 1428 1649500 8570 23120
Any form Mean 0.067 0.11 0.061 0.051 0.055 0.051 0.056 0.09 0.16
of welfare Stand. Dev. 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.36
N 7868 146666 68586 42441 20624 1599 2245738 9424 25578
Note: Standard Dev. -Standard Deviation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
the highest food-stamp usage, followed by the Central American immigrants. Other North American
immigrants consist of immigrants from North American countries like Canada and Bermuda as well
as immigrants from U.S. protectorates like Puerto Rico. Later on in the empirical section of the
paper, we break down this group into two to highlight that the high welfare usage is peculiar to
solely those from the U.S. protectorate. Another salient element of the table is the fact that the
North American immigrants have on average the highest welfare usage in public housing. Overall,
table 1 indicates that the Other North American immigrants have on average the highest welfare
usage in food-stamp, public housing, welfare income and any form of welfare. This immigrant
group is followed by the Central American immigrants. Besides the welfare usage across immigrant
groups, we also present in Table 2 the welfare usage of immigrants by their educational attainment.
Educational attainment ranges from less than 8th grade to doctorate and professionals. With respect
to the educational attainment, the table shows that the North American immigrants have the highest
welfare usage from less than 8th grade up to the associate degree. This group is followed by African
10immigrants with a high school diploma or less. However, we notice that for levels of education
of a bachelor degree or higher, immigrants from Central America have the highest welfare usage
followed my immigrants from Europe. The surprising element of the table is the diﬀerences across
immigrant groups in the intensity of the welfare usage for each level of education. Interestingly,
the results in this table provide some support for the public perception that immigrants from the
third world countries have an intensive usage of the welfare programs especially at the lower levels
of education. As mentioned above, some of the abuses noticed within the system led to the passage
of the PRWORA in 1996. Table 3 summarizes welfare usage across immigration status. We divide
immigrants into those who are naturalized and does who are not. We call those who are not
naturalized citizens “non citizen immigrants”. This category consist of permanent residents, those
on visas and those who are illegal immigrants. Interestingly, Table 3 seems to suggest that non-
naturalized immigrants use welfare programs more intensively than the naturalized immigrants for
all immigrant groups apart from other North Americans (Canada and Bermuda). This result is
surprising giving the fact that many non-naturalized immigrants are not eligible for any welfare
programs because they are on visas or illegal. In addition, post 1996 even permanent residents
experienced added restrictions in access to welfare. A plausible explanation of this fact is that
the vast majority of the naturalized immigrants had already adjusted to the cultural and language
barriers and some other hurdles at the beginning of their “journey” on the host country’s soil. This
explanation validates the assimilation theory, which argues that immigrants tend to diminish the
language and cultural barriers over time by also improving their occupational skills (Kazemipur and
Halli, 2001). Another plausible reason may be the stigma attached to being part of the welfare
within the community might deter naturalized immigrants from taking part in welfare programs.
Unlike newly arrived immigrants who have to face more obstacles before adjusting to the host
nation’s lifestyle, the naturalized are well-established and may attach more importance to ﬁtting in
as Americans.
11Table 2: Welfare Usage by Birth Place and Education Level
Education Africa C.A.C Asia Europe South Oceania Natives Other North
Level America Born America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
<8th grade Mean 0.28 0.16 0.24 0.097 0.14 0.17 0.2 0.36
Stand. Dev. 0.45 0.36 0.42 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.4 0.48
N 470 47363 5541 3944 1858 63 82467 3827
9-12th grade Mean 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.089 0.095 0.1 0.15 0.3
Stand. Dev. 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.36 0.46
High N 608 28900 5357 3426 2443 162 245399 4202
school Mean 0.073 0.088 0.068 0.058 0.053 0.067 0.074 0.13
Stand. Dev. 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.34
N 2785 44010 21821 16678 8942 722 827877 9501
Associate Mean 0.038 0.072 0.042 0.043 0.035 0.033 0.042 0.073
Stand. Dev. 0.19 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.26
N 519 4396 3809 2835 1183 120 126929 1444
Bachelor Mean 0.029 0.054 0.022 0.036 0.027 0.004 0.014 0.027
Stand. Dev. 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.065 0.11 0.16
N 1742 7235 16946 7001 3126 233 248420 2717
Masters Mean 0.016 0.033 0.01 0.028 0.016 0 0.008 0.02
Stand. Dev. 0.12 0.18 0.1 0.16 0.12 0 0.09 0.14
N 596 1664 6482 3209 922 83 84296 859
Doctoral & Mean 0.004 0.033 0.009 0.029 0.013 0 0.006 0.005
professionals Stand. Dev. 0.069 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.11 0 0.08 0.07
N 417 1041 3634 1763 572 45 34112 570
Note: Standard Dev. -Standard Deviation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
4 Theoretical/Economic Foundations of Hypotheses
We assume that the probability a person i in country T uses welfare is a function of a set of variables
X.
Prob(W = 1) = F(X) (1)
X is a matrix of all the expected economic and noneconomic variables or factors impacting the
probability of welfare usage. Variables included in X are sex, age, marital status, employment status,
wages, location (state), immigrants cohort, year of immigration and health status. Government
assistance is usually associated with low levels of living and poverty. We capture the eﬀect of
poverty by including the control variables wages and number of children, which both inﬂuence if an
12individual will be considered poor. If Y=1, an individual uses welfare, whereas Y=0 indicates that
an individual does not use any form of government welfare or assistance.
If country T consist of three types of people. Those born in T (BT), those who immigrate to T
and are now naturalized citizens (NT) and all other immigrants to T (IT). We assume that being an
immigrant does not necessitate welfare usage. Hence Prob(W=1) should be identical for comparable
immigrants and U.S. born citizens. Hence, ceteris paribus, Prob(W = 1)BT = Prob(W = 1)NT =
Prob(W = 1)IT. Meaning that if XBT = XNT = XIT for a group of individuals then such a group
of individuals no matter their citizen status will have similar probability of using welfare in country
T. If individuals in group NT and IT have home countries ranging from i=1......n. Then as long as
Xi,NT = X2,NT = ...........Xn,NT for a subset of individuals or Xi,IT = X2,IT = ...........Xn,iT, the
probability of being on welfare should not diﬀer. Meaning Prob(W = 1)i,NT = Prob(W = 1)2,NT =
Prob(W = 1)3,NT = Prob(W = 1)1,IT = Prob(W = 1)2,IT.........Prob(W = 1)n,IT = Prob(W =
1)n,NT.
We can apply the above frameworks for country T to the U.S. If being an immigrant is not
casually linked with welfare usage and economic and demographic factors can fully explain welfare
usage, then in an econometric analysis, if we control for the X’s (demographic and economic factors),
the probability of using welfare should be the same for U.S. born citizens and immigrants. Similarly,
there should be no statistical diﬀerence in the probability of using welfare based on place of birth
or origin if we control for the X’s that predict welfare usage. This leads to the ﬁrst hypothesis we
test. This hypothesis has two parts Hypothesis 1a: After controlling for factors that aﬀecting
welfare usage, birthplace does not matter for welfare usage in the U.S. Hence, immigrants and U.S.
born have similar welfare usage. Hypothesis 1b: After controlling for factors that aﬀecting welfare
usage, welfare usage is identical for all immigrant groups to the U.S.
Returning to our simple model framework of country T again, if post period t, restrictions are
placed on immigrants IT such that they are unable to use welfare until they become NT, then even
if XBT = XNT = XIT, for period t + 1, Prob(W = 1)BT = Prob(W = 1)NT > Prob(W = 1)IT.
Hence in period t + 1, the Prob(W = 1)IT < Prob(W = 1)IT in period t − 1. If we assume ∆=
Prob(W = 1)t+1
IT − Prob(W = 1)t−1
IT and if we assume that Xi,IT = X2,IT = ...........Xn,iT, then
∆i,IT = ∆2,IT = ∆3,IT.....∆n,IT. Meaning that if the X’s are identical across all i’s the change in
13probability of welfare usage for group IT should decrease similarly no matter the birth continent post
the restriction in period t. Also, given that naturalized citizens are a select group and post reform
the issue of selectivity becomes more important. If individual i was using welfare before reform
and met the criteria for citizenship but never pursued it because of the ﬁxed cost of application
or other personal reasons, post reform, individual L is likely going to apply for citizenship as long
as the total cost of applying for citizenship is less than the beneﬁt gained from welfare support.
Hence post reform the probability of using welfare for naturalized immigrants should rise while
the probability of using welfare for noncitizens should decrease. As above, we expect this change in
behavior to be consistent across immigrant group. Hence for comparable naturalized individuals, the
Prob(W=1) should be the same, regardless of birthplace. Similarly, for comparable noncitizens, the
Prob(W=1) should be the same, regardless of birthplace. We can apply these simple expectation
to the U.S. and this leads to our second and third hypothesis. Hypothesis 2: Given welfare
reform led to an increase in restriction on welfare usage by immigrants who not citizens, then post
reform, the probability of using welfare should decrease for all immigrant groups in comparison to
U.S born, ceteris paribus. However among immigrants, welfare usage should decrease equally for
comparable individuals regardless of birth place continent. Our third hypothesis, which consists
of three parts is also based on the principles and expectations laid out above. Hypothesis 3a:
Ceteris paribus, Naturalized Americans regardless of their birthplace have a higher probability of
welfare usage than comparable Noncitizen immigrants. Hypothesis 3b:Ceteris paribus, the use of
welfare is similar for comparable noncitizens regardless of their birthplace. Hypothesis 3c: Ceteris
paribus, the probability of welfare usage is similar for comparable naturalized citizens regardless of
their birthplace.
Next, we further investigate what could lead to the rejection of the three above hypothesis. For
example, if Prob(W = 1)1,NT  = Prob(W = 1)3,NT  = Prob(W = 1)2,IT....  = Prob(W = 1)n,IT after
controlling for the X’s in a probit model estimation, then it means that citizenship status and or birth
place matters in predicting welfare usage. Similarly, such a ﬁnding could imply citizenship status or
birth place are proxing for other variables not included in X that we do not traditionally expect to
aﬀect welfare usage. It is not impossible that citizenship status could matter in the U.S. because of
the restrictions on welfare usage for noncitizens. These restrictions increased signiﬁcantly post 1996
14when the massive welfare reform was implemented as described in section 2.1 above. Hence even
if individual i’s X is identical to individual k’s X, who is not a citizen, welfare usage would diﬀer
because of the ineligibility of k. Hence the true preference of k is not revealed in the data and and
may create an artiﬁcial diﬀerence in the probability of welfare usage. Given the true preference is
revealed for all who are eligible for welfare, then we should not expect U.S. born citizens, U.S. citizens
from the protectorates and U.S. naturalized citizens who share similar X’s to diﬀer in welfare usage.
If they still do, then it implies that type of citizen matters. Similarly if U.S. naturalized citizens
who share similar X’s diﬀer in welfare usage based on continent of birth, then it means that birth
place matters. Birth place or citizenship type could matter if it is proxing for culture, information,
institutional experience or values of a group. These are variables that we will not typically include in
our X matrix and will not be not include in our regression analysis. We do not include such variables
because we do not traditionally expect values, past institutional experiences, access to information
or culture to play a role in welfare usage. However if our birthplace aﬀects our culture, access to
information and values and a groups culture and value aﬀect their preferences for assistance from the
government, then even if X1 = X2...... = XZ is the same for a subset of individuals from birthplaces
i....n, prob(W=1) will still diﬀer across birth places for this subset of individuals, as long as culture
or values diﬀer based on birth place. Similarly, if the institutions immigrants are exposed to before
they immigrate aﬀect the way they view the government and the role of the government with respect
to getting assistance, then welfare usage may diﬀer across immigrant groups from diﬀerent parts of
the world again even though they share similar X’s. Also, if people select to becoming naturalized
citizens as a mark of their allegiance to a country and this come with a preference of giving back to
the country versus taking, then naturalized citizens might actually have lower probability of using
welfare than noncitizens. This is similar to the thesis that becoming a naturalized citizen may move
individuals into a class or group in the U.S. where perception of welfare usage is negative. In this
scenario, naturalized immigrants in a bid to ﬁt into the group might stop using welfare. In addition,
if immigrants from diﬀerent birth places, view becoming a citizen in the U.S. diﬀerently and this
view or perception aﬀects welfare usage, then among naturalized citizens, the probability of using
welfare may diﬀer across immigrant groups despite similar X’s for the individuals.
15Empirical Strategy
Recall the focus of our analysis is to test three hypotheses that are expectations from our simple
framework highlighted above. Again we recap these hypothesis:
• Hypothesis 1a: Birthplace does not matter for welfare usage in the U.S. Hence, immigrants
and U.S. born have similar welfare usage. Hypothesis 1b:Welfare usage is identical among
immigrant groups to the U.S.
• Hypothesis 2: Given welfare reform led to an increase in restriction on welfare usage by
immigrants who not citizens, then post reform the probability of using welfare should decrease
for all immigrant groups in comparison to U.S. born, ceteris paribus. However among immi-
grants, welfare usage should decrease equally for comparable individuals regardless of birth
place continent.
• Hypothesis 3a Ceteris paribus, Naturalized Americans regardless of their birthplace have
a higher probability of welfare usage than comparable Noncitizen immigrants. Hypothesis
3bCeteris paribus, the use of welfare is similar for comparable noncitizens regardless of their
birthplaceHypothesis 3c: Ceteris paribus, the probability of welfare usage is similar for
naturalized citizens regardless of their birthplace
To test these hypotheses we rewrite equation 1 assuming a probit model as in equation 2.




where Z is a matrix of all the possible factors impacting the probability of welfare usage. The
dependent variable Y is a binary indicator which takes on a value of 1 if an individual is on some form
of welfare and a value of 0 if the individual is not. Φ(.) in equation (2) indicates the standard normal
distribution. Variables included in the Ω matrix are predictors of welfare usage like education,
number of children in the family, size of the family, marital status, employment status and for
immigrants- years in the U.S. Z is a matrix of dummy variables including year and region dummies.
W represents wage which is an important predictor of welfare usage. R is the matrix of the variables
we are primarily interested in. The R matrix can have diﬀerent dummy variables depending on
16the model we are testing. In our main model, our R matrix consists of dummy variables based on
place of birth that divides the sample as follows: born in the U.S., born in U.S. protectorates, born
in other North America (not U.S.), born in Central American and the Caribbeans, born in South
America, born in Europe, born in Asia, born in Africa, born in Oceania and ﬁnally the group others.
The group others are those who did not choose or indicate a place of birth. Variable Y is measured
in two ways the restricted or standard welfare usage and the nonrestricted extended welfare usage.
For the restricted welfare usage, an individual gets Y=1 if the individual gets one or more of these
three welfare programs: food stamps, supplemental security income (SSI) or receiving any income
during the previous calendar year from various public assistance programs commonly referred to
as “welfare”. For the unrestricted measure of welfare or government assistance, an individual gets
Y=1 if any of the above three are received or if the individual gets government subsidized rent or
government subsidized heating.
We choose a probit modeling strategy as against a linear probability model though the lin-
ear probability speciﬁcation of the binary choice model also provides ease of interpretation. This
is because in the linear model, unless restrictions are placed on estimates, coeﬃcients can imply
probabilities outside the unit interval. We focus on the marginal eﬀects from the probit model esti-
mation. These eﬀects represent the marginal impact of an inﬁnitesimal change in each independent
continuous variable on the probability of self-employment, providing the most straight forward inter-
pretation of estimated results from the probit models. For the dummy variables, the interpretations
are slightly diﬀerent as the estimates capture the marginal eﬀect of a change in the probability of
being self-employed for a particular group relative to the baseline group.
To test hypothesis 1 speciﬁcally, we estimate equation 2 and test for signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the estimates of the probability of being on welfare for the diﬀerent groups in matrix R. We test
this hypothesis ﬁrst assuming thee unrestricted measure of welfare and then the restricted measure
of welfare. We test hypothesis 1 in two ways. First, we compare the probability of welfare usage
of immigrant groups to U.S. born. In this analysis we are unable to control for length of stay in
the U.S. This is because this variable is nonapplicable for native born American and including 0 for
this group will distort the estimate. To try to control for the impact of wave of immigration, we
include a dummy for immigration cohort and make native born Americans the baseline group for
17comparison. The use of immigrant cohort dummy is helpful but does not completely deal with the
problem of the impact of years in the U.S. on welfare usage given the role of information in welfare
usage, which is signiﬁcantly correlated with length of stay. To deal with this problem, the second
way we test hypothesis 1 is to eliminate those who are U.S. born from the analysis and compare the
probability of welfare usage solely among immigrants. In this analysis, the probability of welfare
usage for other immigrant birthplace groups is compared to immigrants with a European birthplace.
In this analysis we can control for the years in the U.S., which is a one of the expected variables in
the X matrix.
To test hypothesis 2 we estimate the probability of using welfare for the diﬀerent groups ﬁrst
before reform (1995 survey) and after reform (1996-2007). We can only make use of one year
prereform because the question of place of birth was only fully implemented from the 1995 CPS
survey. Using these estimated probabilities, we compute the change in welfare usage for U.S. born
and compare it to change in welfare usage for each immigrant group.
To test the ﬁnal hypotheses (3a-3c), we restrict our sample to only U.S. citizens ﬁrst and estimate
the probability of welfare usage for all naturalized immigrant groups and citizens from protectorates
in comparison to U.S. born. Next, we eliminate naturalized Americans and limit the sample to U.S.
born and noncitizen immigrants and estimate the probability of welfare usage for noncitizen immi-
grants in comparison to U.S. born. We then compare the diﬀerence in welfare usage of naturalized
Americans to the welfare usage of noncitizen immigrants. Given this analysis does not allow us
to control for years in the U.S., again we redo this analysis excluding native born Americans and
compare welfare usage among naturalized immigrants groups and subsequently we compare welfare
usage for non citizen immigrants. In these latter two analysis, the base group for comparison are
immigrants from Europe.
5 Results
Table 4 captures the estimation of the probit model on the sample population using both measures
of welfare: the all inclusive measure and the restrictive measure. We present the marginal impact of
the probit estimation for ease of interpretation. We use these estimates to test the ﬁrst hypothesis.
In column (1) and (3) we focus on the entire sample and the base group for comparison is U.S.
18born. In contrast, in column (2) and (4) we focus solely on the immigrant population, including
immigrants from U.S. territories. In this estimation we control for years since immigration, which
may also impact the likelihood of welfare usage. At the bottom of Table 4 we highlight the estimates
of some of the variables we use as controls in the welfare usage probability model and also mention
other variables we control for including eduction and health. The results using both measures of
welfare are diﬀerent but the conclusion in testing the hypothesis of interest is the same. The results
in Table 4 show that despite controls for what should typically predict welfare usage, welfare usage
is conspicuously higher for certain groups. Immigrants from U.S. protectorate like Puerto Rico,
Guam and U.S. virgin Islands have the highest probability of any group using any form of welfare.
With both measures of welfare we reject the hypothesis of similar welfare usage across groups
based on birth place continents. Although immigrants from South America, Canada (other North
America), Oceania and Europe use any form of welfare at the same rate as U.S. born, immigrants
from Asia, Africa, Central American and U.S. protectorates use welfare more1 The result in columns
(2) and (4) conﬁrm this ﬁnding of diﬀerential welfare usage among birthplace continent using the
data restricted to solely immigrants. It also highlights the importance of including a control for
length of stay. Notice that the result using the unrestricted welfare measure suggests that among
immigrant groups, only immigrants from Europe and South America share identical probability of
welfare usage. Other immigrant groups have higher probability of welfare than Europeans apart
from immigrants from Canada who have the lowest probability of welfare usage among immigrant
groups.
It is worth noting that focusing on the restricted or standard welfare measure, provides slightly
diﬀerent results for immigrants from Oceania and Europe. The result from column (3) suggests that
Oceania and Canadian immigrants are 1% less likely to use any standard welfare than individuals
who are U.S. born. They are the only groups with a lower probability of welfare usage than U.S.
born. In contrast, while Europeans immigrants are equally as likely to use any type of welfare as U.S.
born, they have a 0.6% higher probability of using standard welfare than U.S. born. In addition
they are more likely to use standard welfare than immigrants from Oceania, Canada and South
America. Also using this standard measures of welfare, the results from Table 1 shows that though
1Hence forth I will refer to other North America as Canada because the bulk of the immigrants that fall under this
category are from Canada. However this group includes those from Bermuda.
19immigrants from Asia, Africa and North America are still more likely to be on welfare than U.S. born
individuals, the gap is much smaller than with the unrestricted welfare measure. Given the results in
Table 1, we reject the hypothesis that welfare usage is identical across immigrants and U.S. born and
also reject the related hypothesis 1b that welfare usage is identical for immigrant groups. Although
some immigrant groups have identical welfare usage rates as summarized in column (2) and (4),
the results suggest that some immigrant groups use welfare more. It is worth mentioning that the
probability of welfare usage for immigrants from U.S. protectorates is signiﬁcantly higher than every
other group. Speciﬁcally, the probability of welfare usage for immigrants from U.S. protectorates is
9.9 percentage point higher than the next highest immigrant group (Africa) in terms of probability
of welfare usage.2
The results in Table 5 and Table 6 summarizes the result of several estimations that allows us test
our second main hypothesis. The results in Table 5 summarize our ﬁnding using the non restrictive
measure of welfare while the results in Table 6 highlights our ﬁnding using the standard or restricted
welfare usage measure. In both Table 5 and 6 columns (1) and (2), we focus on the whole sample
while in columns (4) and (5) the focus is solely on immigrants. columns (1) and (4) provide the
pre-reform estimates of the probability of welfare usage while columns (2) and (5) provides the after
reform estimate. Recall that with our second hypothesis, we predict that given welfare reform led
to an increase in restriction on welfare usage by immigrants who not citizens, then post reform the
probability of using welfare should decrease for all immigrant groups in comparison to U.S. born,
ceteris paribus. However among immigrants, welfare usage should decrease equally for comparable
individuals regardless of birth place continent.
The results in columns (1), (2) and (3) allows us to test the ﬁrst part of this hypothesis using
the unrestricted welfare measures. From Table 5 it is clear that our hypothesis is rejected. All
immigrant groups increased probability of welfare usage in comparison to U.S. born post welfare
reform. Prior to the reform, all groups had a lower probability of being on welfare than U.S. born
with immigrants from Central America and the Caribbean having the lowest probability (a 10%
lower probability). The Post-reform saw drastic changes in the usage of the welfare. Immigrants
from Europe, Oceania, South America and Central American and the Caribbeans all have similar
2Africa only has a 4.1 percentage point higher probability of welfare usage than the base group Europe.
20welfare usage probability as U.S. born while immigrants from Africa and Asia now have a higher
probability of being on welfare than U.S. born. Note that the estimates in Table 5 columns (2) and
(5) are similar to those in Table (4), columns (1) and (2). The only diﬀerence is that we do not
control for health status in the estimations of welfare usage in Table 5 and 6 because health status
is not available in the pre reform period data. Interestingly, the diﬀerences in this estimate though
not substantial suggests that health is a determinant of welfare usage. The estimates in columns (3)
is direct evidence leading to the rejection of hypothesis 2. The positive coeﬃcient indicates welfare
usage increases versus decline. To test the related hypothesis that the change in welfare usage
should be similar across immigrant groups, we turn to the results in Table 5 column (6). Given the
change in welfare usage for other immigrant groups in comparison to European immigrants diﬀer
statistically, we reject hypothesis 2b. Our results suggest that while immigrants from Africa and
Oceania have increased welfare usage probability more than those from Europe, immigrants from
Asia, South America, Canada and Central America have increased the probability of welfare usage
less than immigrants from Europe.
The results using the standard or restrictive measure of welfare in Table 6 conﬁrm the results
in Table 5. Pre-reform, standard welfare usage for all immigrant groups was less than U.S. born
while post reform, the use of standard welfare increased for all immigrants groups with immigrants
from Africa, Asia, Europe all with higher probability of using a standard welfare program than U.S.
born. Comparing the change in welfare usage probabilities in column (3), Table 5 and 6 suggest
that immigrants increased welfare usage for all types of welfare. However, notice that the increase
in probability of standard welfare usage is smaller for all immigrant groups than the increase in the
unrestricted welfare usage probability. Also using the standard welfare measure, our results in Table
6 columns (4)- (6) conﬁrms results in Table 5 that changes in welfare usage for immigrant groups
diﬀered, with African immigrant groups experiencing the highest increase.
In terms of which immigrant group increased welfare usage the most or the least, we turn to
the results in column (6) in Table 5 and 6. Increases in welfare usage seems highest for immigrants
from Africa and lowest for immigrants from U.S. protectorates. We test these changes for signiﬁcant
diﬀerence across groups and note that changes post reform was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across groups
but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for all groups. For example, the change in U.S. protectorates in
21probability of welfare usage was statistically diﬀerent from the change in South America, Africa or
Oceania. These results are unexpected and could imply a number of issues which we highlight next.
5.1 Possible Reasons for Rejection of Hypothesis 2
The test of the ﬁrst hypothesis led to the rejection of the thesis that welfare usage should not
diﬀer across groups. This result suggests that welfare usage is not aﬀected by solely economic
and standard demographic. This implies that culture, value, network information or institutions of
groups might have a signiﬁcant role to play in individuals choice to use welfare. Culture, values,
network information and institutional background were not controlled for in our probability model
and may explain the diﬀerential welfare usage across group despite controlling for the standard
economic and demographic variables that should predict welfare usage.
In contrast to the ﬁrst hypothesis where our results may be explained by not including some social
controls, the rejection of the second hypothesis is more unexpected. The theoretical expectation and
prediction given an increase in restriction on welfare usage should be decreased usage. However with
both measures of welfare usage, we see an increase in probability of welfare usage for all groups in
comparison to the U.S. and diﬀerential increases across immigrant groups. One possible reason for
this reverse result is the change in the population of immigrants over time. Post 1994, the sample
of immigrants to the U.S. has changed signiﬁcantly both in country of origin distribution and types
of individuals (high skill, medium skill, low skill). Before 1990 most immigrants to the U.S. came in
based on either based on family reuniﬁcation, marriage and schooling. However, in the early 90s the
U.S. government implemented the diversity visa lottery. The inception of the diversity visa lottery
(D.V lottery) in 1995 provided another avenue through which families from most countries in the
world meeting some criteria could immigrate to the U.S. as permanent residents. From 1995 when
the ﬁrst 40,301 gained entrance into the U.S. through this means, every year 55,000 more people
from selected countries all over the world are issued this immigration visa. This types of people may
share diﬀerent values, perceptions and view than early immigrants and hence may act diﬀerently
with respect to welfare usage, all other things being equal. Also post 1990 the number of immigrants
moving to the U.S. based on refugee and asylum increased. This increase was precipitated by an
increase in wars and civil conﬂicts in diﬀerent parts of the world especially in Africa. Again though
we control for income, the perception, attitude or view of these select groups of individuals given
22there experiences could be diﬀerent and this may explain our surprising result. Also, given the
visa lottery changed the distribution of immigrants across countries from each continent, then it
makes sense that the average perception or values coming from each continent could changed over
time. In addition, though we control for education, education acquired outside the U.S. especially
in LDCs is not as good a predictor of income in the U.S. as education acquired in the U.S. This
again may partly explain the increases likelihood of welfare usage despite this control. However
the increase in probability of usage for immigrants from developed countries also, for which the
transferability of education is less tenable, suggests that education transferability cannot be the
only explanation for this reverse result. It is important to note that this ﬁnding is not implying that
usage of welfare has increased or the proportion of people on welfare have increased for immigrants.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁgure 1 shows that the proportion of people on welfare has fallen over time post reform
for immigrants more than for citizens and the proportion of immigrants on welfare is slightly less
than the proportion of U.S. born on welfare presently. This ﬁgure suggests that the reform did
reduce immigrants welfare usage share as expected. However, our result shows that this policy did
not reduce but rather increased the probability of welfare usage for immigrants who still qualiﬁed
to get government assistant. In addition, our ﬁndings suggest that for comparable individuals, the
choice of welfare seems to have changed for immigrants. Prior to reform, immigrants were less likely
than U.S. born to use welfare and now post reform, immigrants are more likely to use welfare.
However this result could be driven by the changes in immigrant types overtime.
To check if the change in the immigration population is driving the unexpected results of increase
in probability of welfare usage post reform, we redo the post reform analysis restricting the sample
of immigrants to those who were already in the U.S. by 1995. Results for this robustness analysis
are summarized in Table 7. Although the estimates change, our inference and conclusions using this
restricted sample of immigrants is still the same. Meaning we still reject hypothesis 2. However it
is important to highlight some diﬀerences in the results. Though the probability of using welfare
in comparison to U.S. born increased for all immigrant groups, the increase is less pronounced for
most immigrant groups than the earlier regression seemed to suggest. This is especially true for
Asian and African immigrants. For these two groups, the use of welfare post 1996 is similar to U.S.
born for immigrants who arrived before 1996 while an inclusion of all immigrants suggests a higher
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Figure 1: Trends in Welfare Usage for Immigrants and U.S born
Note: The X axis shows the years and proportion using welfare is on Y axis.
24probability of welfare usage in comparison to U.S. born post reform. For immigrants from Canada
and South America the results do not change from those in Table 5. Interestingly, U.S. protectorates
and immigrants from the Central America and Caribbeans are the only group with higher increase
in the probability of welfare usage for its immigrant arriving before 1996 in comparison to all its
immigrants, post reform. For immigrants from U.S. protectorates who are all eligible to use welfare,
this result may imply a change in types of immigrants from these territories post 1996 or a change
in the perception of welfare usage for more recent immigrant cohorts. However for immigrants
from Central America and Caribbean, this result is more likely a reﬂection of the large increase
in illegal immigrants from this region in the late 90s who are all not eligible for welfare programs.
Hence a higher increase in probability of welfare usage for pre 1996 immigrants from this region in
comparison to post 1996 immigrants from this region could simply reﬂects a decrease in eligibility
distribution among post 1999 immigrants from Central America and the Caribbeans.
The results in Table 7 provide support for our thesis that part of the noted increase in the
probability of welfare usage is solely driven by change in immigrant population post 1996. However,
the result in Table 7 shows that change in immigrant population is not the only factor that has
led to this increased probability in comparison to U.S. born. One possible explanation for the
increased probability among immigrants who arrived before 1996 could be that the welfare reform
and the media coverage that came with it provided ample information on welfare eligibility that
might not have been available among some immigrant communities before the reform. This increase
in information could lead to an increase in usage for those who were eligible prior to reform but were
not aware of it. Hence increased information as was available through the welfare program overhaul
could have led to an increase in usage for those eligible despite the decrease usage for immigrant
who were no longer eligible for welfare. The net eﬀect from these two opposing forces could be an
increase probability of welfare usage for immigrant groups in comparison to U.S. born. It is also
possible that the introduction of welfare reform led to an increase in welfare usage among eligible
immigrants who did not use welfare previously just to help their relations and community of recent
immigrant who were no longer eligible to get welfare beneﬁts because of the reform. Implying that
within immigrant communities, a form of transfer system could have emerged as a response to the
reform. Meaning those who are eligible and previously did not use welfare, now take advantage of
25welfare only to support those who are not eligible within the community and need support which
they can no longer get from the government.
The ﬁnding highlighted in Tables (4)-(7) above could be downwards biased with respect to
revealing the true preference for welfare usage among immigrants. This is because though we have
a revealed preference for U.S. born Americans with regards to welfare usage, we do not have a
revealed preference for a good portion of immigrants. Immigrants who are not permanent residents
and U.S. citizens are not eligible for most government assistance. Even those who are permanent
residents are restricted in their access for a certain number of years post 1996. Hence, the fact that
the share of immigrants on welfare is dropping does not tell us anything about the true preference
of immigrants for welfare use.
One way to get around this problem and ensure that we get a sense of the true preference for
welfare usage for immigrants, is to compare U.S. born Americans to immigrants whose preference
are revealed. To implement this, we restrict the sample of immigrants to solely those who are
naturalized. In addition, decomposing the set of immigrants into those who are citizens and those
who are not will also help us in testing our third hypothesis. Our third hypothesis has three
separate parts. Each of these sub hypothesis are tested though our decomposition of immigrants
and estimating the probability of welfare usage for citizen immigrants in comparison to U.S. born.
These results are in column (1) Table 8 and 9. Subsequently, we focus on noncitizen immigrants,
comparing them with U.S. born. This result is summarized in column (2) of both Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 captures the result using the nonrestricted welfare measure while Table 9 summarizes the
result using the restricted measure of welfare.
The results are again interesting and quite unexpected if only economic or demographic factors
are supposed to matter as predictors of welfare usage. We reject hypothesis 3a. We ﬁnd that Natu-
ralized Americans on average have a lower probability of welfare usage than Noncitizen immigrants
and not a higher probability. Notice from Table 8 column (1) and (2) that all naturalized American
have equal or lower probability of welfare usage than U.S. born.3 In contrast, noncitizen immigrants
from Asia, Africa, Oceania, Central American and the Caribbean, Europe have a higher probability
of welfare usage than U.S. born immigrants while noncitizen immigrants from Canada and South
3We do not show immigrants from US protectorates in this analysis because they are neither naturalized or non
citizen immigrants. We already have shown that they use welfare at a much higher rate than U.S. born.
26America have a similar probability of welfare usage as U.S. born.4 Interestingly, if we compare nat-
uralized immigrant solely among themselves, the results in Table 8 column (4) suggests diﬀerential
welfare usage among naturalized immigrant groups. In comparison to naturalized immigrants from
Europe, all other naturalized immigrant use welfare slightly more apart from those from Oceania
and Canada who have similar probability of welfare use as naturalized immigrants from Europe. For
noncitizen immigrants the results are slightly diﬀerent. In comparison to noncitizen immigrants from
Europe, some nonimmigrant groups use welfare slightly more, while South America and Canada use
welfare slightly less. Only those from Oceania have similar probability of welfare use as noncitizen
immigrants from Europe.
The results from Table 9 using the restricted measure of welfare is slightly diﬀerent from the
results using the unrestricted measure of welfare in Table 8. However it also leads to a rejection
of hypothesis 3a, naturalized Americans do not have a higher probability of being on welfare than
immigrant who are noncitizens. We also reject hypothesis 3b based on the results in Tables 9. The
use of standard welfare is not similar for all comparable noncitizens from diﬀerent birth place and
similarly, the probability of welfare usage is not identical for naturalized immigrant groups.
The results in Table 8 and 9 suggests that naturalized immigrants do not use welfare more than
noncitizen immigrants, second welfare usage diﬀer among both naturalized immigrants based on
birth place and also diﬀers among noncitizen immigrants.
5.2 Robustness Check–Hypothesis 1
Returning to the ﬁrst hypothesis on does birthplace continent matter for welfare usage, we can
retest this hypothesis focusing solely on those who are eligible for welfare usage. Recall in our
earlier test of this hypothesis we did not address the issue of eligibility. Rather we estimated the
likelihood of welfare usage for all immigrant birth place groups. However, given preferences are not
revealed for those who are ineligible for welfare and these immigrants are included in the sample of
all immigrants, then focusing solely on naturalized immigrants and citizens from U.S. protectorates
4The only group with higher probability of welfare usage is the group that consists of U.S. territories and naturalized
citizens from Canada. However this higher welfare usage for this group is not driven by the naturalized immigrants
from Canada but by immigrants from U.S. territories. If we isolate the Canadians naturalized immigrants, we actually
ﬁnd that naturalized Canadians have a similar probability of welfare as naturalized Americans from other group and
U.S. born.
27in comparison to U.S. born should be more appropriate for testing hypothesis one. Looking again
at table 8 and 9 column (1), which focus solely on naturalized immigrants and U.S. born leads to
new conclusions. First, given preference for welfare is revealed for naturalized citizens the results for
naturalized immigrants provides concrete evidence that immigrant birthplace matters for welfare
usage. Hence we still reject hypothesis 1b. With respect to hypothesis 1A we still reject the
hypothesis that immigrants and U.S. born have similar welfare usage. Recall that true preference
for welfare is revealed for three groups: U.S. born, U.S. protectorates citizens and naturalized
citizens, and though U.S. born and naturalized citizens on average share similar probabilities of
using welfare, immigrants from U.S. protectorates have a much higher welfare usage than U.S.
born.5 A possible issue that could cloud the validity of this results is self selection. It is possible
to argue that immigrants select to become naturalized citizens and the preference of naturalized for
welfare usage could be very diﬀerent for noncitizen immigrants even if we could observe their true
welfare usage preference. Meaning that we cannot assume that comparable noncitzen immigrants
will use welfare similarly to naturalized immigrants if welfare restrictions are lifted. Similarly, we




Also we can conclude from this result that using the restricted measure of welfare could be mis-
leading. This implies that concentrating on the three main types of government assistance could
lead to a biased opinion on welfare usage across immigration groups in the U.S. Notice from Table
8 that is seems naturalized immigrants from Asia use welfare more than those who are U.S. born
and naturalized immigrants from Oceania seem to use welfare less. However, with the unrestricted
measure all three groups share similar probabilities. Similarly, naturalized immigrants from Ocea-
nia seems to have lower probability of welfare usage as naturalized immigrants from Europe but in
reality they have similar probability of welfare usage.
5Recall from Table 8 that for naturalized citizens, welfare usage is similar to U.S. born for naturalized immigrants
from all birth places apart from Canada for which the probability of welfare usage is slightly less than U.S. born.
28Possible Explanation for results: Culture, Values and Institutions
or Self Selection
Our results has led to several unexpected ﬁndings. First, the fact that American citizens from U.S.
protectorates are more likely than any other group to use welfare is surprising. Second, ﬁnding
that comparable individuals from some immigrant group have diﬀerent probability of welfare usage.
Third, we ﬁnd that the probability of welfare usage increased post reform even for immigrants
arriving before the reform. Fourth, for some birthplace groups, we ﬁnd higher probability of welfare
usage by noncitizen immigrants in comparison to naturalized Americans from the same group. These
unexpected results could be driven by several factors. We will highlight possible explanation for
these results, however we do not providing evidence for or against each of the potential explanation
because this is beyond the scope of our paper.
First, culture, values and individuals’ exposure to institutions are variables that economists
traditionally do not consider because of the diﬃculty in quantifying these variables. However, it
makes sense that a person’s culture, value or experiences may aﬀect the way they view the use of
welfare or the individuals preference for or against governments help and assistance. We can view
individuals cultural view of welfare usage as the preference of a group for government assistance.
Given anecdotal evidence on diﬀerent people groups perception on welfare usage in the U.S., it is
not impossible to imagine that preference for welfare may diﬀer across countries. This diﬀerence
could be linked with institutional experiences or other factors. Second If we think of those who are
naturalized as a select group who choose U.S. citizenship because of their allegiance or respect for
the U.S. and their interest in serving or giving back or being totally part of this country, then these
individuals are more likely not to use welfare if they do not absolutely need it. This may explain
the lower welfare usage among naturalized immigrants for some birthplace groups in comparison to
noncitizen immigrants from those continents despite the existence of restrictions on welfare usage on
a portion of the latter (only permanent residents among noncitizen immigrants are eligible for some
government assistance), which should typically lead to lower welfare usage for noncitizens. Third,
it is possible that the increase in welfare usage post the reform, even among those who immigrated
before the reform, may be due to the fact that some of those who were not eligible before 1996 for
29welfare, become eligible over time as they moved from visas to permanent residence status.6 Also
as highlighted previously, it may be that the whole media coverage of the welfare reform provided
a lot of information to groups who did not know much about welfare usage previously, which could
lead to higher welfare usage. In addition as highlighted earlier also, eligible immigrant might be
using welfare more post reform not for themselves but transferring beneﬁts to other member of
their community (extended family) who are not or no longer eligible for welfare programs but need
assistance.
One argument against diﬀerences in culture and values in birthplace groups as it relates to
welfare usage is that if diﬀerences in welfare usage can be explained by an immigrants’ culture
and values, and if culture and values are similar among immigrants from the same birthplace, then
probability of welfare usage should be the same for naturalized and noncitizen immigrants from
the same birth place whose preferences are revealed. However, our results indicate otherwise and
suggests that either culture and value varies within countries/ birthplace groups, or other factors
like information and experience have a role to play. Information and experience can diﬀer within
and between immigrant groups and can explain diﬀerences in probability of welfare usage for citizens
and noncitizen immigrants from the same immigrant group. Given the extremely high use of welfare
for citizens from U.S. protectorates in comparison to everyone else, it is possible that information
has a role to play. The role of information and networks on welfare usage has been documented in
the past. Immigrants from U.S. protectorates are U.S. citizens from birth and are more likely to
have more information than immigrants from anywhere else. However, their access to information
does not address the question of why they use welfare more than U.S. born Americans who should
have the same or more information. Hence though information may be important for welfare usage,
other factors still have a role to play in explaining our results.
6 Conclusion and Inferences
In this paper we try to answer three related questions by testing several simple hypotheses. First,
we create a simple model that indicates that if only demographic and economic factors matter, we
do not expect comparable individuals to use welfare at diﬀerent rates. Hence, individuals birthplace
6 Also recall that the law only made restriction on welfare usage for new permanent resident immigrants and not
for permanent resident immigrants before 1996.
30should not matter for welfare usage. This is the basis of the ﬁrst hypothesis we test. Second we
argue that a change in policy that restricts welfare usage for non US citizens should lead to a decline
in the probability of welfare usage for all immigrants in comparison to U.S. born. In addition, ceteris
paribus, the decline in welfare usage for all immigrant groups should be similar as the reform did
not create diﬀerential restrictions on immigrants based on place of birth. These expectation led
to our second set of hypotheses. Our ﬁnal hypothesis is based on the premise that naturalized
immigrants and U.S. born Americans are the only groups whose true preferences for welfare are
revealed post the 1996 reform. This is because the change in policy does not aﬀect these groups.
However, for noncitizen immigrants, especially those who are on visa and illegal, the fact they are
not on welfare does not say anything about their preference or non-preference for welfare usage.
Hence, we expect that the probability of welfare usage would be higher for naturalized immigrants
compared to noncitizen immigrants simply because of the restriction on the latter.
Our results leads to the rejection of all our posed hypotheses. First our results show that though
many immigrant groups have identical probabilities of welfare as U.S. born, not all do. Hence, birth-
place matters for welfare usage in the U.S. In particular, our results suggest that immigrants from
U.S. protectorates use welfare more than any other group. Second, counter to what we expected,
our result suggest that despite a decline in the proportion of immigrants using welfare post welfare
reform in 1996, the probability of welfare usage increased for all groups post reform in comparison
to U.S. born. We show that this result is not driven solely by changes in immigrant population type
over the last 10 years and immigrants arriving pre reform also experienced an increase in probability
of welfare usage in comparison to the U.S. Our results also shows that this increase in probability of
welfare usage post 1996 diﬀers across immigrant groups. Lastly, we also ﬁnd that in contrast to what
we expect, naturalized immigrants on average use welfare less or equal to noncitizen immigrants.
What can we infer from these results or what do these results suggest? First, other non traditional
factors may be important for welfare usage. The culture, institutions and values people share may
shape their perception of welfare usage. In addition, peoples experiences and the information they
have may aﬀect their likelihood of welfare usage. All these factors were not controlled for in our
probability model and could explain this unexpected result. Also the distribution of immigrant types
from each continent has changed signiﬁcantly over the 90s. The inception of the visa lottery and
31the increase in refugee immigrants from war torn countries in Africa and other parts of the world
can partly explain this change in the distribution. This change in the distribution may explain part
of the rise in probability of welfare usage post reform, although our results show that even among
immigrants arriving before reform, a rise in probability is noted. It is important to note that our
results do not suggest that welfare reform did not reduce welfare usage on average. Rather, we
try to ﬁnd explanation for our unexpected result. The immigrant population in the U.S. may have
changed a lot over the last decade and if these new immigrants had diﬀerent experiences or have
diﬀerent culture, institutions and values because they come from diﬀerent countries within these
continents, they may view welfare usage very diﬀerently.
In addition, the fact that naturalized immigrants from some continents use welfare less or the
same as noncitizens (given the restriction on this group) may suggest ﬁrst a selection process into
being naturalized and may also suggest that this selection process may diﬀer based on birthplace.
Meaning that people selecting to become naturalized citizens may have diﬀerent values and per-
ception than other immigrants from the same continent, which may aﬀect their decision not to use
welfare.
Our ﬁnding suggest the need for much more research on the decision to use welfare or not.
Clearly, other non traditional factors matter for welfare usage and being able to single out these
factors will be of importance with respect to suggesting policy that will attenuate unnecessary
welfare usage in the U.S. In future work, we hope to focus on immigrants from U.S. territories and
try to identify the role of information and other factors in explaining the high welfare usage of this
group in comparison to any other immigrant and citizen group.
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34Table 3: Welfare Usage by Immigration Status and Birth Place
Birthplace Naturalized Non-naturalized U.S. born
(1) (2) (3)
Africa Mean 0.074 0.15
Stand. Dev. (0.26) (0.36)
N 2864 4355
Central America Mean 0.14 0.15
& Caribbean Stand. Dev. (0.34) (0.36)
N 35628 103928
Asia Mean 0.077 0.10
Stand. Dev. (0.27) (0.30)
N 30521 31317
Europe Mean 0.065 0.094
Stand. Dev. (0.25) (0.29)
N 18113 15051
South America Mean 0.085 0.087
Stand. Dev. (0.27) (0.28)
N 7066 12362
Oceania Mean 0.071 0.14
Stand. Dev. (0.26) (0.35)
N 464 877
Other Mean 0.1 0.17
Stand. Dev. (0.3) (0.38)
N 3090 5098
Other North Mean 0.063 0.052
America Stand. Dev. (0.24) (0.22)
N 2627 3391






Standard Dev. -Standard Deviation
35Table 4: Does birth place matter for welfare usage?
Independent Unrestricted Welfare Measure Restricted Welfare Measure
Variables
anywelfare anywelfare welfstandard welfstandard
(excludes U.S. born) (excludes U.S. born)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U.S. Protectorate 0.085* 0.14* 0.051* 0.079*
(0.01) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Other North America -0.005 -0.014* -0.01* -0.021*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
C.A.C 0.008* 0.03* 0.004 0.014*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
South America -0.002 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.008*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Europe 0.004 0.007*
(0.004) (0.003)
Asia 0.018* 0.022* 0.012* 0.010*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Africa 0.023* 0.041* 0.008* 0.014*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Oceania 0.008 0.019* -0.010* -0.016*
(0.008) (0.01) (0.003) (0.004)
Others 0.018* 0.036* 0.009* 0.017*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
age -0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-41.780 6.140 -46.400 6.500
sex 0.006* -0.005* 0.004* -0.004*
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
famsize -0.005* -0.003* -0.001* 0.001*
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.00)
children 0.027* 0.024* 0.017* 0.017*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
def income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.000) (0.00)
yrs in the U.S. no -0.0009* no -0.001*
(0.000) (0.009)
State Dum yes yes yes yes
Year Dum yes yes yes yes
Employment yes yes yes yes
Immigrant cohort yes no yes no
Married Dum yes yes yes yes
Health Dum yes yes yes yes
Educ yes yes yes yes
Note: estimates are marginal impacts from probit estimation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
* 5% signiﬁcance level
Dependent variable is welfare usage
36Table 5: What was the eﬀect of the reform on welfare usage across groups [Unrestricted Welfare
Measure]
Variables anywelfare anywelfare anywelfare anywelfare
(excludes U.S. born) (excludes U.S. born)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
before reform postreform change before reform postreform change
U.S. Protectorates -0.068* 0.094* 0.162 0.239* 0.147* -0.092
(0.001) (0.011) (0.024) (0.005)
Other North America -0.067* -0.008 0.067 -0.014 -0.017* -0.017
(0.001) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004)
C.A.C -0.104* 0.009* 0.113 0.085* 0.034* -0.051
(0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.002)
South America -0.068* -0.002 0.068 -0.004 -0.002 0.00
(0.001) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003)
Europe -0.081* 0.004 0.081
(0.002) (0.005)
Asia -0.080* 0.020* 0.100 0.067* 0.023* -0.044
(0.002) (0.006) (0.015) (0.002)
Africa -0.065* 0.024* 0.089 0.043 0.042* 0.042
(0.001) (0.007) (0.045) (0.005)
Oceania -0.064* 0.007 0.064 -0.090* 0.015 0.090
(0.001) (0.008) (0.019) (0.01)
Others -0.070* 0.019* 0.089 0.034* 0.039* 0.005
(0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006)
Sex 0.003 0.006* -0.009 -0.005*
(0.002) (0.00) (0.006) (0.001)
no child 0.043* 0.028* 0.041* 0.024*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
years in USA no no yes yes
State Dum yes yes yes yes
Year Dum no yes no yes
Employment yes yes yes yes
Immigrant cohort yes yes no no
Married Dum yes yes yes yes
Health Dum no no no no
Educ Dum yes yes yes yes
Wages yes yes yes yes
Family size yes yes yes yes
age yes yes yes yes
Note: estimates are marginal impacts from probit estimation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
* 5% signiﬁcance. Note: Estimates that are not signiﬁcant are treated as 0 in calculating the diﬀerence between
columns (1) and (2) and between (4) and (5) highlighted in column (3) and (6).
37Table 6: What was the eﬀect of the reform on welfare usage across groups ? [Restricted Welfare
Measure]
Independent ALL Diﬀerence Only Immigrants Diﬀerence
Variable:
welfstandard welfstandard change welfstandard welfstandard change
(excludes U.S. born) (excludes U.S. born)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
before reform postreform change before reform postreform change
US protectorates -0.041* 0.058* 0.099 0.159* 0.085* -0.074
(0.001) (0.008) (0.021) (0.005)
Other North America -0.041* -0.012* 0.029 -0.039* -0.022* 0.017
(0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002)
C.A.C -0.066* 0.005 0.066 0.045* 0.016* -0.035
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002)
South America -0.042* -0.004 0.042 -0.011 -0.007* -0.007
(0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
Europe -0.050* 0.007* 0.057
(0.002) (0.004)
Asia -0.050* 0.013* 0.063 0.038* 0.010* -0.028
(0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.002)
Africa -0.040* 0.009* 0.049 -0.008 0.015* 0.015
(0.001) (0.004) (0.035) (0.004)
Oceania -0.039* -0.012* 0.027 -0.077* -0.017* 0.061
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
Others -0.041* 0.010* 0.051 0.012 0.019* 0.019
(0.001) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004)
sex 0.003* 0.004* -0.009 -0.004*
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.005) (0.001)
no children 0.030* 0.018* 0.034* 0.017*
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.001)
Years in USA no no yes yes
State Dum yes yes yes yes
Year Dum no yes no yes
Employment yes yes yes yes
Immigrant cohort yes yes no no
Married Dum yes yes yes yes
Health Dum no no no no
Educ Dum yes yes yes yes
Wages yes yes yes yes
Family size yes yes yes yes
age yes yes yes yes
Note: estimates are marginal impacts from probit estimation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
* 5% signiﬁcance.
38Table 7: Eﬀect of the reform on welfare usage across groups for pre 1996 immigration cohorts?
Variable: ALL Diﬀerence Only Immigrants Diﬀerence
Independent anywelfare anywelfare anywelfare anywelfare
(excludes U.S. born) (excludes U.S. born)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
before reform postreform change before reform postreform change
U.S. protectorates -0.068* 0.133* 0.201 0.239* 0.152* -0.087
(0.001) (0.024) (0.024) (0.007)
Other North America -0.067* -0.017 0.067 -0.014 -0.01* -0.01
(0.001) (0.009) (0.021) (0.004)
C.A.C -0.104* 0.031* 0.414 0.085* 0.04* -0.045
(0.003) (0.0115) (0.012) (0.002)
South America -0.068* -0.001 0.068 -0.004 0.007* 0.007
(0.001) (0.011) (0.016) (0.003)
Europe -0.081* -0.008 0.08
(0.002) (0.010)
Asia -0.080* 0.017 0.08 0.067* 0.027* -0.04
(0.002) (0.018) (0.015) (0.002)
Africa -0.065* 0.022 0.065 0.043 0.034* -0.009
(0.001) (0.014) (0.045) (0.006)
Oceania -0.064* 0.064 -0.090* 0.009* 0.099
(0.001) (0.008) (0.019) (0.012)
Others -0.070* 0.016* 0.089 0.034* 0.028* -0.06
(0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006)
Note: estimates are marginal impacts from probit estimation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
* 5% signiﬁcance. Note: Estimates that are not signiﬁcant are treated as 0 in calculating the diﬀerence between
columns (1) and (2) and between (4) and (5) highlighted in column (3) and (6). controls identical to above regressions
39Table 8: Does immigration status matter for welfare usage?
Variable: Any Welfare Any Welfare exc U.S. born
Naturalized Noncitizen Diﬀerence Naturalized Noncitizen Diﬀerence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Other North America -0.005* -0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.025* -0.025
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
C.A.C 0.012 0.008* 0.008 0.038* 0.022* -0.016*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
South America 0.001 -0.002 0.00 0.012* -0.012* -0.024*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Europe -0.003 0.010* 0.010
(0.005) (0.005)
Asia 0.013 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 0.016* -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Africa 0.004 0.033* 0.033* 0.023* 0.046* 0.023*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Oceania -0.008 0.019* 0.017* 0.006 0.019 0.00
(0.008) (0.01) (0.012) (0.013)
Others -0.001 0.031* 0.031* 0.015* 0.048* 0.023*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Sex 0.007* 0.007* 0.000 -0.003* -0.004* -0.001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.002)
family size -0.005* -0.005* 0.001 -0.005* -0.001* 0.004
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
children 0.026* 0.027* 0.001 0.020* 0.031* 0.011
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
deﬁnc 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.00) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000)
Years in the USA no no yes yes
Year Dum no no no no
State Dum yes yes yes yes
Year Dum no yes no yes
Employment yes yes yes yes
Immigrant cohort yse yes no no
Married Dum yse yes yes yes
Health Dum no no no no
Educ yes yes yes yes
Age yes yes yes yes
Note: estimates are marginal impacts from probit estimation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans
* 5% signiﬁcance.
Calculating the diﬀerence: note that estimates that are not signiﬁcant are treated as 0 in ﬁnding the diﬀerence. * on
the diﬀerence column means diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
40Table 9: Does immigration status matter for welfare usage?
Variable: Standard Welfare Standard Welfare exc U.S. born
Naturalized Noncitizen Diﬀerence Naturalized Noncitizen Diﬀerence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Other North America -0.008* -0.009* -0.001 -0.010* -0.031* -0.021
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
C.A.C 0.007 0.004 0.00 0.018* 0.006* -0.012*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
South America 0.001 -0.003 0.00 0.003 -0.019* -0.019*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Europe 0.001 0.012* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.004)
Asia 0.011* 0.013* 0.002 0.012* 0.001* -0.011*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Africa 0.001 0.013* 0.013* 0.009* 0.01* 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Oceania -0.011* -0.008 0.011 -0.008 -0.023* -0.023*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Others -0.008 0.018* 0.018* 0.005 0.021* 0.021*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Sex 0.004* 0.004* 0.000 -0.002* -0.004* -0.002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
famsize -0.002* -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.002* 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No child 0.016* 0.017* 0.001 0.011* 0.023* 0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
def inc 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.000) (0.00)
Year in the USA no no yes yes
Year Dum no no no no
State Dum yes yes yes yes
Employment yes yes yes yes
Immigrant cohort yes yes yes yes
Married Dum yes yes yes yes
Health Dum no no no no
Educ yes yes yes yes
Age yes yes yes yes
Note: estimates are marginal impacts from probit estimation
C.A.C- Central America and the Caribbeans * 5% signiﬁcance.
Calculating the diﬀerence: note that estimates that are not signiﬁcant are treated as 0 in ﬁnding the diﬀerence.
* on the diﬀerence column means diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
41